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ABSTRACT: In this paper, we analyze how an airline can take advantage of airport dominance 
of a whole network in a market characterized by short-haul routes and congestion. In order to 
tackle this issue, we estimate an equation system, which is based on theoretical grounds, for the 
Spanish domestic market. We find that costs and demand benefits of airport dominance have to 
do with providing a high flight frequency. Such benefits can damage seriously the effectiveness 
of competition as long as the competitive status of major airline’s rivals is threatened. 
 
I. Introduction 
Air transport liberalization in the European Union (EU) has produced positive effects 
on traveler welfare. In domestic markets, travelers enjoy a greater choice among a 
number of alternatives, higher flight frequency and lower prices in the busiest routes. 
Nevertheless, there is a consensus that the achievement, maintenance and increase of 
these benefits in the post-liberalization period depends fundamentally on effective 
competition on those routes.
1 It follows that there is concern about the scale advantages 
major airlines hold in their domestic markets as a consequence of their dominance of 
airport access.  
Indeed, the allocation of slots in European airports is based on grandfather rights that 
give “ownership” to airlines on the basis of previous use. Hence flag carriers, which had 
a monopoly or duopoly in the provision of domestic or international services in the 
regulation period, can claim the majority of slots in most airports within their national 
network. This is particularly relevant in case of airport congestion. In addition to this, a 
common characteristic of EU domestic markets is that most of routes are short-haul 
routes.   2
The objective of this paper is to examine how an airline can take advantage of airport 
dominance of a whole network in a market characterized by short-haul routes and 
congestion. In order to meet this objective, we estimate an empirical model, which is 
based on theoretical grounds, for the Spanish domestic market during 2001 and 2002 
At this point, it must be pointed out that the results of this study can be applied to 
the rest of the EU with some confidence because the Spain domestic market is the 
largest in the European Union, as is shown in table 1. The size of Spanish domestic 
aviation results from three factors. First, major cities in Spain are far from each other. 
Second, many high-density connections serve the country’s islands. Finally, the quality of 
service on alternative transport modes is relatively low. Therefore, the large size of the 
Spanish market, along with a strong tradition of charter airlines, allows us to claim that 
the Spanish market is an upper bound in terms of competition opportunities in the 
European context. Additionally, the analysis of the Spanish market allows capturing the 
influence of airport congestion on airline competition. Indeed, the airports of Madrid or 
Barcelona are one of the endpoints of the majority of Spanish routes. In the period 
considered both airports were highly congested.
2   
(Insert table 1 about here) 
There is an extensive empirical literature on competition in the airline industry.
3 The 
effect of airport dominance on airline prices is one of the main issues that emerges from 
this literature. It is generally found that airport dominance, along with route dominance, 
explains the ability of major airlines to charge higher prices than their competitors. In 
these studies, the price effects of airport dominance follow exclusively from the 
“premium” that major airlines can charge to passengers departing from their main hubs. 
However, the airport dominance of European flag carriers can be even higher in small 
airports. While low cost airlines operating from secondary airports near major cities have 
succeeded in competing with flag carriers on many inter-European routes, the “low cost 
effect” is much more modest in domestic markets. 
In addition, product differentiation has not usually been treated as a primary 
assumption in previous studies.
4 However, looking directly at differentiation in the airline 
industry is sensible if we are to test explicitly the cost and demand advantages of airport 
dominance. Indeed, we argue that product differentiation explains the advantages that 
follow from slot control.   3
It must be understood that this study is focused on markets based fundamentally on 
short-haul routes. In this way, the average distance of our route sample is 746 kilometers. 
In short-haul routes, flight frequency is the major determinant of quality and it has 
effects on airlines costs (Doganis 2001). Indeed, such frequency influences costs and 
demand on a route as long as it determines capacity and waiting time for airlines services. 
In turn, the flight frequency that airlines can offer depends on airport access. Thus the 
main competitive advantage that an airline can achieve from airport dominance in a 
short-haul market comes from offering a high frequency of flights. 
Wei and Hansen (2005) show that airlines can obtain higher returns in market shares 
from increasing service frequency than from increasing aircraft size in non-stop duopoly 
markets. Their empirical model is focused on the demand side due to the unavailability 
of good instruments on the supply side. In this paper, we jointly estimate demand and 
supply functions.  
The remainder of this paper fleshes out the effects of airport dominance on short-
haul markets and tests them empirically. In the next section, we analyze economic 
features that have the greatest influence on airline competition. In the third section, we 
provide the framework for the hypotheses that are to be tested in the empirical analysis. 
In the fourth, we specify the data used in the empirical analysis, the results of which we 
describe in the fifth. Finally, the last section focuses on the implications of the results.  
 
II. Airline Competition  
Competition in the provision of air transport services depends both on demand and 
supply side characteristics. On the supply side, the seminal study of Caves et al. (1984) 
distinguishes between density and scale economies. Density economies refer to unit cost 
variations due to increases of output on a route. Scale economies refer to unit cost 
variations due to proportional changes both in the size of the route network and in the 
output on each route of the network. The issue here is that although the existence of 
density economies is generally accepted in the sector, there is no clear evidence 
addressing the existence of scale economies (Tretheway and Oum 1992). In fact, density 
economies along with constant scale economies imply that it is not necessarily cost 
efficient to have just one airline dominate all the main airports of a national network.   4
On the demand side, one must note the existence of two different types of travelers. 
On the one hand, business travelers are not as sensitive to prices but pay considerable 
attention to time.
5 Leisure travelers, on the other hand, are time insensitive but price 
sensitive. Furthermore, air transport is one of the main examples of industries with 
consumer switching costs (SC). This is due to the use of frequent flier programs (FFP) to 
create brand loyalty in travelers once they have bought an airline’s services (Suzuki and 
Walter 2001). Indeed, travelers who switch airlines lose opportunities to obtain points 
toward various benefits, such as free trips.  Thus SC are associated to the opportunity 
cost of these benefits. 
Klemperer (1987) analyses the role of SC in a two-stage model of oligopoly 
competition. In the second period, SC and the market shares of each firm are 
determined by sales in the first period. Price competition depends inversely on the SC in 
that second period. This relationship follows from the fact that a higher SC means that 
lower prices attract fewer consumers and, at the same time, lead to a greater sacrifice of 
profits from those consumers already captured by an FFP. Thus, in case of high SC, 
there will be few incentives to reduce prices and equilibrium is going to be found near 
monopoly prices.  
Klemperer’s analysis implies the hypothesis that different competition conditions 
arise depending on the market segment to which airlines address their services. Indeed, 
passengers can be differentiated by the amount of SC they bear. FFPs play a limited role 
(and SCs are not relevant) in the market segment focused on leisure travelers. As a result, 
price competition can be tough. However, FFPs can play an important role (SCs should 
be relevant) in the market segment focused on business travelers and may soften price 
competition. Other features, such as quality, can become the main competition variable.  
Recognizing that density economies and demand heterogeneity are both prominent 
characteristics of the airline industry, it is clear that the benefits of airport dominance in 
a market based on short-haul routes come from the role played by flight frequency. A 
higher flight frequency allows a better adjustment to traveler scheduling preferences, and 
in turn, reduces waiting time. Along with the business traveler’s preference for airlines 
that offer flexibility in flight schedule, the demand side advantages that arise from high 
frequency are also related to FFP. A greater number of destinations makes a free trip 
more valuable, and higher flight frequency at each airport speeds the accumulation of  5
points. Indeed, flight frequency can be understood as a quality variable because it 
determines waiting time and allows a more efficient exploitation of FFP. 
In turn, these advantages on the demand side do not exclude the exploitation of 
density economies on the cost side. As long as a high flight frequency reduces the cost of 
a trip in terms of time, it could cause an additional increase in demand. A high flight 
frequency also leads to a high annual utilization of planes and crews (Doganis 2001). 
Furthermore, frequency allows a carrier to increase the proportion of business travelers 
per flight, which reduces the break-even load factor (OCDE 2000). Finally, the cost 
diseconomies that arise from the use of smaller planes as frequency rises are especially 
relevant in long-haul routes (Wei and Hansen 2003).
6 Over shorter routes, we want to 
stress, a high flight frequency is not necessarily cost damaging, whereas the demand side 
advantages can be substantial.   
The main determinant of flight frequency in a given route network (and the size of 
this network) is the number of slots that an airline can use in the corresponding airports, 
particularly in case of airport congestion. Given that the allocation of slots in Europe is 
based on grandfather rights, we argue that European flag carriers could benefit from 
airport dominance in their domestic markets by providing a high flight frequency in the 
majority of routes. Indeed, they can capture business travelers through flight schedule 
flexibility and leisure travelers through price discounts. In the following section, we 
develop a methodology to test the effects of airport dominance in airline markets.   
 
III. The empirical model  
III.1. Demand   
Given that service frequency is the main determinant of quality in short-haul air 
transport markets, the demand conditions in a vertical product differentiation model can 
be stated. Products are defined by the pair (S,P) where P is price and S is the quality of 
the product. It is assumed that each airline offers a product of a specific quality in each 
market where it operates, so that it is possible to distinguish products according to an 
increasing ordering of quality: S1<S2<....<Sn. Prices for each variant of quality do not 
have a predetermined ranking: P1,P2,.........Pn. However, higher levels of quality are 
generally associated with higher prices.   6
It is also assumed that each consumer buys one unit of the product that maximizes 
her utility; given the prices and quality of available products, or alternatively, she does 
not buy any product. Hence the utility of consumer i from consuming the product of 
quality Sτ at price Pτ can be expressed as follows: 
 Uiτ (θ,τ)   =  θiSτ - Pτ  if the consumer buys one unit of the product  
                     0            if the consumer does not buy any unit of the product         (1) 
 
Consumer preferences for quality,θi, are distributed in the interval [0,+∞] according 
to a cumulative distribution function F(θi), where F(0) = 0 and F(+∞)=1.
7 In the choice 
between adjacent quality varieties, a consumer with a preference for quality θ ~
 will be 
indifferent to varieties τ and τ-1 if U(θ ~,τ) = U(θ ~,τ-1), that is, θ ~Sτ - Pτ = θ ~Sτ-1 - Pτ-1.  
Rearranging, the equilibrium condition is obtained: 












.                                                                  (2) 
 
Thus, the demand of the product with quality Sτ will be equal to the proportion of the 
potential number of consumers, N, with a preference for quality,θ, such that θ > θ ~. 
That is;  
                                 Qτ = N[1-F((Pτ-Pτ-1)/(Sτ-Sτ-1))].                                              (3)    
 
The equation (3) shows the demand for a product with a specific quality, which 
depends on the potential number of consumers and the prices and quality of the 
products associated with different quality varieties. Thus, this equation can be also 
expressed as follows: 
 
                               Qτ = f (N, Pτ, Pτ-1, Sτ, Sτ-1).                                                        (3’)    
 
In air transport markets, the equations (3) and (3’) show the demand of transport 
services of the airline j in the market (route) k, Qjk. The services of the airline j are 
associated with a set of prices and a specific flight frequency (which determines quality). 
The price of each transport service is not unique because airlines can discriminate across 
the different types of passengers (i.e; business or leisure passengers), using different fare 
classes with different restrictions.  
The available data does not allow estimating a demand equation that includes the 
prices effectively charged to each passenger. On the contrary, we must rely on aggregate  7
demand data to account for the different competition conditions associated with the 
different types of passengers. However, it is sensible to argue that quality effects will be 
mostly related to business passengers and price effects will be mostly related to leisure 
passengers.  
For the empirical specification, the demand for the transport services of the airline j 
(j=1,…,n)  that competes in the route k, (Qjk), can be expressed as the product of a 
market demand function (Qk) and an airline market share function (MSjk), where MSjk = 
Qjk/Qk.  
Thus, and taking into account that the equilibrium condition in a vertical product 
differentiation model excludes cross price elasticities among firms, an airline’s demand 
function can be expressed as: 
 
                              Qjk = Qk (Pk,Sk,Nk)MSjk(Pjk/Pk , Sjk/Sk,1)                                   (4)   
 
Where market demand (Qk) depends on the average quality (Sk), the average prices 
(Pk) and variables for the potential number of travelers (Nk). The market share of each 
airline (MSjk) depends on the relative quality (Sjk) and the relative prices (Pjk) of each 
airline with regard to the market average (Sk, Pk).  
Imposing the logarithmic form, the empirical specification for the demand equation 
in the route k can be expressed as follows:  
 
  log(Qk) =α1+β11log(Pk)+β12log(Sk)+β13log(Nk) +β14D
island+ β15win01+β16sum02 + ε1k,       (5)   
 
where the dependent variable is the total number of passengers carried in each route 
(Qk). We include in the demand equation the following explanatory variables:  
1) The average prices in route k (Pk).  
In order to account for the different fare classes, we approximate average prices 
through the average prices in the unrestricted economy class (P
eco
k) and a dummy 
variable (D
discount
jk) that takes value 1 where airlines set relevant discounts on the 
economy (unrestricted) class and zero in other case.
8 We evaluate the existence of 
relevant discounts, using a strict statistic criterion. Discounts are considered to be 
relevant when the variable for price discounts (the rate between the lowest fare class and 
the unrestricted economy fare class) takes a value lower than the standard deviation with  8
respect to the mean. This dummy variable interacts with the average price in the 
unrestricted fare class. Thus, the final expression of the average prices in route k is as 
follows: β11log(Pk)= β’11log (P
eco





2) The average quality in route k (Sk). 
The discussion about switching costs and frequent flier variables in section II refers 
to the demand effects, especially for business trips, of flight frequency as a quality 
variable. Hence we approximate the average quality through the average flight frequency.  
One must take into account the possible endogeneity of frequency since variations in 
demand can be adjusted to through variations in service frequency. Such frequency 
depends on the quantity and spread of an airline’s slots in the corresponding airports. 
The availability of new slots in the period considered was very low in the main Spanish 
airports and the allocation rules for the existing slots are very tight, which supports the 
exogeneity of this variable. However, we estimate two alternative versions of the demand 
equation according to the treatment of this variable.  
3) The potential number of consumers in route k (Nk) is approximated through the 
average population of the origin and destination regions of the route.  
4) We include as route fixed effects a dummy variable for routes that have an island as 
an endpoint (D
island
k). This variable can capture traffic generation due to the lack of 
competition coming from other transport modes and due to the tourism effect.   
5) We include as seasonal effects dummy variables for winter at 2001 (win01) and 
summer at 2002 (sum02). According to the period of our data set, this means that 
summer at 2001 is considered to be the baseline period. We do not have data available 
for winter at 2002. 
6) ε1k is a random error term.  
Imposing the logarithmic form, the empirical specification for the market share 
equation of airline j in route k can be expressed as follows:  
log(MSjk)=α2+β21(Pjk/Pk)+β22log(Sjk/Sk)+β23D
island+β24win01+β25sum02+ε2jk                     (6) 
 
where the dependent variable is the market share of each airline in the route in terms 
of the passengers carried over it (MSjk). We include in the market share equation the 
following explanatory variables:  
1) The relative prices of each airline with respect to the market average (Pjk/Pk).   9
Airlines price differences in the unrestricted fare classes are small.
9 In addition, we 
expect that such differences are fundamentally related to the different levels of quality, 
which are captured through the relative flight frequency.  
Thus, we approximate the price effect in the market share equation through the 
dummy variable for relevant discounts on the economy (unrestricted) class, which is 
constructed in the same way as in the analogous variable for the demand equation. 
Alternatively, we could use the relative prices in the lowest fare class in a continuous 
form. However, due to the high variability of such prices, we do not have good 
instruments for producing such a variable.   
2) The relative quality of the product of each airline with respect to the market 
average (Sjk/Sk).  
As we mention above, the quality effect is approximated through flight frequency. 
Hence the variable for relative quality is measured through the relative flight frequency 
of each airline with respect to the route average. It may be necessary to account for the 
possible endogeneity of the relative frequency if we find such endogeneity for the 
analogous variable in the demand equation.  
3) As in the demand equation we add a set of control variables for the empirical 
specification, which refer to route and seasonal fixed effects. Such variables are 
constructed in the same way as the analogous variables in the demand equation. 
In the analysis of short-haul airline markets, a relevant feature of routes where islands 
are one of the endpoints is the lack of competition coming from other transport modes. 
This fact could distort airline competition for this type of routes as long as collusion 
behavior is easier to implement here.  Furthermore, the two rivals of the Spanish flag 
carrier, Spanair and Air Europa, have a long tradition as providers of charter flights and 
their operating base is established in the major tourist destination, Palma de Mallorca. 
Thus, systematic differences across carriers in terms of market share can be expected 
according to the type of endpoints where they address their services 
4) ε2jk is a random error term.  
The sign of variables for prices and flight frequency can be seen as evidence of the 
way in which airlines compete to attract the different types of travelers. Indeed, a 
positive sign can be expected in the coefficient of the variable for price discounts, given 
that competition to attract leisure passengers should focus fundamentally on prices. That  10
is, higher discounts should be associated with a higher market share of leisure 
passengers. Additionally, a positive sign is expected in the variable for relative frequency. 
This effect should be associated primarily with business passengers.  
 
III.2. Supply  
Having determined demand conditions, we need to characterize airlines competition 
in a non-cooperative oligopoly framework. We begin with the assumption that the 
decision process of airlines has two stages. In the first stage, such airlines choose 
capacity, which depends on the aircraft fleet and flight frequency. Thus, perceived quality 
is determined in this first stage. In the second stage, given the capacities and quality 
offered by all airlines in the framework, they choose prices. Kreps and Scheinkman 
(1983) show that a two-stage game in which two firms make simultaneous 
determinations of capacity and then price is equivalent to the traditional one-stage 
Cournot model. Moreover, several empirical studies find that airlines’ market behavior is 
similar to the Cournot solution.
10 Thus, the assumption of competition à la Cournot seems 
to be sensible. 
Given the demand conditions previously formulated, the inverse market demand 
function takes the following form: 
 
                                   Pk = F(Qk,Sk,Nk),                                                                   (7) 
 
where quality (Sk) refers to flight frequency. The cost function can be expressed as 
follows: 
                          Cjk =Cjk (Distk,,Qjk(FQjk, equipjk , lfjk), ωj)                                           (8) 
 
where Cjk is the total costs of airline j from operating on the route k. Total airline 
costs depend on route distance (Distk), output (Qjk) and input prices (ωj). It must be said 
that the empirical model exploits differences across routes, so that the exclusion of input 
prices (mainly wages and salaries) should not affect the results as long as they can be 
considered airline specific fixed costs. In turn, an airline’s output is determined by the 
product of service frequency (FQjk) and aircraft size (equipjk). In order to obtain the 
quantity finally sold, such product must be multiplied by load factor (lfjk).  
The reduced form of the Cournot profit function for each airline j= 1,.....n in the 
market k can be expressed as follows:   11
 
                                πjk(Qk) = QjkPk(.) - Cjk(.).                                                            (9)   
 
Profit maximization by each airline leads to the following first order conditions: 
 
























,                                       (10) 
where λ=∂Qk/∂Qjk is the conduct parameter, which takes value 1 under the Cournot 
assumption. Solving equations (7) and (10) simultaneously for each airline and assuming 
symmetry across airlines, first order conditions can be expressed as follows:  
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where Ejk is the specific price-demand elasticity of each airline, C’jk is the marginal cost 
(C’jk = ∂Cjk/∂Qjk) and nk is the number of competitors (nk). From (11), it is possible to 
identify the pricing equation as a mark-up on marginal costs:  
                                 Pjk = φjk(Sjk/Sk, nk)C’jk(Distk, Qjk),                                         (12) 
 
where the mark-up (φjk) is a function of the airlines’ relative quality (Sjk/Sk) and the 
number of competitors (nk), while marginal costs (C’jk) are a function of route distance 
(Distk) and the number of passengers carried on it (Qjk). 
Note that a high flight frequency could have a cost reducing effect in short-haul 
routes. In addition flight frequency is considered to be the main determinant of quality in 
short-haul air transport markets. Thus, the effect of a frequency increase on the prices 
charged by airlines could be ambiguous, given that this variable influences both price 
determinants in an opposite direction:
11     
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In airline markets one must account for the price that is charged to each passenger. 
However, the available data does not allow estimating a pricing equation at that level of 
detail. Under the Cournot assumption, prices are understood as mark-up on marginal 
costs. This must be the case for prices in the economy unrestricted fare class, which is 
considered to be a price reference for all fare classes. Indeed, prices in the business and  12
lowest fare classes can be understood as a mark-up and a discount respectively on prices 
in the economy unrestricted fare class.  
Thus, our approach relies on estimating a pricing equation for the economy 
unrestricted fare class and identifying the determinants of discounts in the lowest fare 
class through a binary choice model. In this way, the discount policy can be stated as a 
discrete choice (D
discount
jk) of making or not making discounts of a significant amount, 
which can be expressed as follows:  
 
                   Ujk = F(Cjk/Ck, nk) 
                   D
discount
jk =  1  if  Ujk> 0                                                                          (13)   
                                    0 if  Ujk≤ 0 
where Ujk is the utility that airlines obtain from discounts. This utility depends on the 
airlines’ relative costs with regard to the market average (Cjk/Ck), which is mostly 
determined by cost economies related to traffic density. In addition, it depends on the 
intensity of competition (nk), which approximates benefits of discounts in terms of 
attracting passengers.  
Imposing the logarithmic form, the empirical specification for the airlines’ pricing 
equation in the economy unrestricted fare class can be expressed as follows: 
log(Pjk)=α3+β31log(Distk)+β32log(Qjk)+β33log(Sjk)+β34log(HHIk)+β35win01+β36sum02+ε3jk, (14) 
 
where the dependent variable is the price in the economy unrestricted fare class (Pjk). 
The explanatory variables included in this pricing equation are the following:  
1) The number of kilometers that separate the origin and destination regions of the 
route (Distk).  
This variable allows estimating cost economies related to actual routing distance. 
There are several reasons that explain that costs increase less than proportionally to 
kilometers flown. Long-haul routes involve higher average speeds, less intensive 
consumption of fuel and a lower frequency of some fixed costs (such as airport fees).  
2)  The number of passengers carried for each airline in the route (Qjk), which allows 
an estimate of cost economies related to route traffic density. As we mentioned above, 
the existence of density economies in the provision of air transport services is generally 
accepted.  
3) The quality of the product offered by each airline (Sjk).   13
Such quality is measured through a variable for airport presence, which is built 
through the average share of each airline, in terms of annual national departures, in the 
origin and destination airports of the route. An alternative measure could be the share of 
each airline in terms of annual domestic departures on the origin airport. However, as 
tables A1 and A2 in the appendix show, the former seems to be a better measure in our 
context because the sample is based on three origin airports and the share of the Spanish 
flag carrier is high in the majority of origin and destination airports.  
As we mention above, the discussion about switching costs and frequent flier 
variables in section II refers to the demand effects, especially for business trips, of flight 
frequency as a quality variable. Given that airport presence and flight frequency are 
correlated, the use of the former variable seems to be appropriate in the analysis of the 
prices charged by airlines as long as one of our main goals is to test the effects of airport 
dominance on the supply side.  
This variable can have a cost effect in terms of the exploitation of density economies 
but this effect should be captured by the variable for demand.  
4) The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHIk) in order to assess accurately the effect 
on prices of the intensity of competition. It must be taken into account that our sample 
is based on non monopoly routes. 
5) We add a set of control variables for the empirical specification, which refer to 
seasonal fixed effects. Such variables are constructed in the same way as the analogous 
variables in the demand and market share equation.   
The variable dummy for routes with an island as an endpoint is excluded from the 
equation to be estimated because its effects should be captured by the variable for route 
traffic density.  
6) ε3jk is a random error term. 







               + γ5win01+γ6sum02+ηjk,                                                                                                                                         (15) 
 
where the dependent variable is a dummy variable that takes value 1 when airlines 
apply a relevant discount to the prices of the economy unrestricted class (D
discount), and  14
zero otherwise. This dummy variable is built in the same way as the analogous variable 
for the demand and market share equations.  
The explanatory variables included in this equation are the following:  
1) The relative size of the aircraft used by airlines with respect to the market average  
(equipjk/equipk)  
2) The share of each airline in terms of departures in the corresponding airports of 
the route with respect to the market average (APjk/ APk).  
3) The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHIk) in order to assess accurately the effect 
on discounts of the intensity of competition. 




The dummy variable for routes where islands are one of the endpoints can affect 
discounts in two opposite ways. First, discounts could be higher since more leisure 
travelers are expected to islands destinations. Secondly, discounts could be lower since 
competition coming from other transport modes does not take place here. Thus, the sign 
of the coefficient for this variable is a priori ambiguous 
5) We include as seasonal fixed effects variables dummy for winter at 2001 (win01) 
and summer at 2002 (sum02).  
6) ηjk is a random error term. 
The variables for the size of the aircraft and airport presence can have cost and 
quality effects. Nevertheless, we do not expect a significant quality effect in the fare 
classes addressed to leisure passengers.  
The cost effect related to density economies could be captured by a demand variable 
but our policy discount equation allows us to take the role of airport presence into 
account when calculating the probability of making discounts. Indeed, the main interest 
of this equation is to capture explicitly the influence of airport dominance on the 
probability that airlines will make discounts to attract price sensitive consumers. 
The fact that a major airport presence allows airlines to charge higher prices in the 
fare classes addressed to business travelers, and additionally allows more frequent 
discounts in the fare classes addressed to leisure travelers, would be consistent with the 
argument that airlines derive competitive advantages from airport dominance through 
product differentiation.   15
IV. Data  
The sample used in the empirical analysis is composed of 35 Spanish domestic non-
stop routes in which more than one airline is operating with regular flights, and we 
differentiate between the summer and winter. In general terms, the structure of prices (in 
the full-fare classes) and flight schedules of airlines vary between, but not within, 
seasons. Such inter-season variation is especially important in the Spanish case because it 
is a strongly tourist oriented market. We include dummy variables for season (win01, 
sum02) in all the equations to be estimated as seasonal fixed effects. All data refers to 
2001 and 2002.  
Information about the total number of passengers carried by each airline on each 
route has been obtained from the “Boletín de la Oferta por Tramos y Mercados del 
Programa de Vuelos Regulares” that publishes the General Directorate of Civil Aviation 
(Ministry of Transport).  
Demand data refers to non-stop service, without distinguishing between connecting 
and final traffic. We exclude from the analysis routes with intermediate points, which 
show a much higher demand inconvenience and higher costs than non-stops routes in 
short-haul markets. Indeed, Lijensen et al. (2002) show that direct and non direct flights 
are imperfect substitutes. However, the indirect flight is not a substitute when it lasts 
about twice as long as the direct flight. This must be the case in the majority of short-
haul routes. Additionally, the Spanish flag carrier is the one airline that can effectively 
exploit a network effect (in terms of additional demand) that might arise from 
connections to international destinations. Indeed, the fact that our data does not allow 
distinguishing between connecting and final traffic should not bias our results as long as 
connecting passengers refers mostly to services of the network carrier. T he possible 
network effect, which is omitted due to data restrictions, should reinforce results related 
to airport dominance advantages such that it even damages the smaller airlines.  
Data on frequency, aircraft size and prices have been obtained for a sample week. 
Information regarding flight frequency and aircraft size has been obtained from the 
Official Airlines Guide (OAG). The round trip prices, differentiating between the lowest 
fare class, the economy (unrestricted) fare class and the business class, charged by each 
airline have been obtained from their respective websites.   
  16
Variables of prices for the different fare classes are used in order to capture demand 
heterogeneity. Unfortunately, a weighted distribution of passengers in the different fare 
classes is not available. This fact could affect our results if the distribution varies 
substantially across routes and airlines. The use of variables that make reference to route 
characteristics can help in controlling for these differences. In any case, the 
interpretation of the results should take this possible bias into account.  
There is a high variability in the prices charged by airlines in the lowest fare class. In 
order to account for this variability, we have obtained this data under homogeneous 
conditions for each airline. That is, data have been collected one month before traveling, 
the price is for the first trip of the week and the return is on Sunday. However, this 
homogeneous procedure for obtaining our data does not avoid a possible bias when 
using the variable for discounts in a continuous form because the exact amount of the 
discount can change in very short time. This explains our preference for using the 
variable for discounts in a discrete form. However, in the appendix we present the 
results of alternative specifications of some of the equations of the system developed in 
section III. In particular, the variable for prices in the alternative specification of the 
demand equation is an average between prices in the lowest fare class and prices in the 
economy unrestricted fare class, while the variable for discounts in the alternative 
specifications of the market share equation and the policy discount equation is measured 
in a continuous form.  
The population variable is the total average population in the regions of origin and 
destination of a route, according to the population on the first of January according to 
the Statistics National Institute (INE). Data on the percentage of national departures of 
airlines from origins and destinations have been obtained from the “Anuario Estadístico 
de Tráfico” published by the Spanish Airports and Air Navigation (AENA) agency.  
Finally, a few facts about the Spanish air transport market will be helpful. The main 
competitor of the Spanish flag carrier, Iberia, is Spanair, mainly owned by the 
Scandinavian airline, SAS. In third place is Air Europa, owned by a firm devoted to 
tourist activities. Iberia was privatized in a gradual process that finished in 2001. British 
Airways is currently one of the Iberia’s major shareholders. According to the General 
Directorate of Civil Aviation (Ministry of Transports), the Spanish market is composed 
of about 100 routes, and Iberia maintains a monopoly on half of them. In routes where  17
Spanair and/or Air Europa offer services, Iberia’s market share lies between 50 and 90 
per cent. Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics of the main variables used in the 
empirical analysis.  
(Insert table 2 about here) 
V. Estimation and results 
The demand, market share and pricing equations are estimated as an equation system, 
with the policy discount equation estimated separately from the rest of the equations. It 
can be easily shown that our system of equations is over identified. It is common to 
estimate over identified systems through some method based on the Instrumental 
Variables Technique. In this way, all the equations of the system are estimated through 
the Two Stage Least Squares estimator (TSLS). Estimates have been made equation by 
equation, providing the other equations of the system with the instruments for the 
endogenous explanatory variables of each equation. A simultaneous estimation of the 
system is considered to be more efficient, but any possible misspecification of an 
equation moves to the rest of the system.  
 (Insert table 3 about here) 
Table 3 shows the results for the demand equation where prices are treated as 
endogenous variables. All the explanatory variables have the expected signs, although the 
dummy variable for islands is not significant. We found that the possible bias of 
considering frequency an exogenous variable is modest, as it could be expected from 
restrictions regarding the use of slots. Given the potential number of travelers and the 
fixed effects, it is found that prices and flight frequency are the main determinants of 
demand. Indeed, the overall significance of the demand equation is very high.  
In addition, our results show a relatively high elasticity of demand to flight frequency 
since the corresponding parameter takes a value greater than one. This result is 
consistent with the S-curve effect of service frequency on airline’s demand (Wei and 
Hansen 2005). Indeed, demand increases can be even more than proportional to 
frequency increases because of the quality effect 
On the contrary, we find a relatively low price elasticity of demand. Aggregate 
demand increases by about 6 per cent for every 10 per cent decrease in average prices. 
The high proportion of routes with islands as endpoints (16 of 35) in our sample could 
explain the low price elasticity of demand. Indeed, although routes where islands are one  18
of the endpoints should have a high number of leisure passengers, the lack of intermodal 
competition can make passengers less sensitive to prices. 
(Insert table 4 about here) 
Table 4 shows the results for the market share equation, where the variable for 
relative prices is treated as endogenous. As in the demand equation, there is an 
endogeneity issue regarding the variable referencing relative service frequency. However, 
the same argument and test for including this variable as exogenous in the demand 
equation applies in the market share equation. 
All the explanatory variables have the expected signs. Indeed, coefficients for the 
variables for price discounts and relative quality are positive. Thus, the evidence is that 
airlines compete both in price and quality to attract passengers. It can be expected that 
price competition is more relevant for the leisure segment of the market, whereas quality 
competition dominates in the business segment of the market. We also find systematic 
differences in routes with islands as endpoints.  
 (Insert table 5 about here) 
Table 5 shows the results for the pricing equation in the economy unrestricted fare 
class, where the variable for demand is treated as endogenous. All the variables have the 
expected signs.  
Evidence is found that cost economies related to distance and traffic density are 
substantial. Indeed, average prices in the unrestricted economy fare class decreases by 
about 4 and 1 per cent for every 10 per cent decrease in distance and increase in route 
traffic density. Although the size of the density economies obtained seems to be modest, 
it must be said that the negative sign of the variable for demand is consistent with the 
existence of decreasing marginal costs. Indeed, marginal costs can be understood as the 
sum of the costs of carrying an additional passenger for a given capacity (which is 
expected to be constant) and the costs of providing additional capacity (Brander and 
Zhang 1990). The additional capacity can be provided using bigger planes and/or 
increasing service frequency. Bigger planes are generally more efficient and higher service 
frequency increases the annual utilization of the planes and crew. Thus, the costs of 
providing additional capacity decrease so that, under our interpretation, it is sensible to 
find that marginal costs decrease with the level of demand.   19
 In addition, a positive sign in the coefficient of the variable for airport presence is 
found. In this way, average prices in the economy unrestricted fare class increase by 
about 1 per cent for every 10 per cent increase in airport presence. Although the size of 
the airport presence effect seems to be modest, it must be recognized that such effect 
refers exclusively to the mark-up that airlines charge on marginal costs.  
The variable for the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index is not significant. Taking into 
account that our sample is based on non monopoly routes, previous studies have shown 
that the effect of this variable should not be too relevant. In this way, Graham et al. 
(1983) find that prices are positively correlated with route concentration, although this 
relationship decreases with the level of concentration. Additionally, Borenstein (1989) 
finds that airport dominance matters more than route dominance in explaining airline 
prices. Finally, Evans and Kessides (1993) find an important price differential in 
comparisons between monopoly and duopoly routes, but the difference is quite small 
when a third or fourth competitor is added.  
(Insert table 6 about here) 
Table 6 shows the results of the estimation for the policy discount equation. All the 
variables have the expected sign, although the variable for the Herfindahl-Hirschman 
Index is not significant. We account for a possible endogeneity bias of the variable for 
aircraft size using data from the previous year.
12 In this equation, the positive sign of the 
variable for airport presence is especially relevant, which means that an airline’s share of 
an airport’s slots positively influences the probability of discounts. The fact that a higher 
airport presence allows higher prices in the full fare classes along with more frequent 
discounts in the lowest fare classes is consistent with the product differentiation 
explanation of the airport dominance advantages. Finally, the negative sign of the 
dummy variable for islands shows that the negative effect of the lack of intermodal 
competition overweight the positive effect of more leisure travelers 
To sum up, the main result that can be inferred from the pricing and policy discount 
equations is that higher scales of operations in an airport allow airlines to both increase 
demand and reduce costs. Indeed, the evidence for the U.S. case (Borenstein 1990, 
Evans and Kessides 1993, Berry et al. 1996) shows that the quality effect of airport 
control on an airline’s prices is higher than the cost effect. However, the cost effect was 
more important than the quality effect in the study by Marín (1995) of the inter- 20
European market. Our analysis seems to find a possible explanation for that 
contradiction, since it demonstrates that it is necessary to differentiate across the type of 
consumers to which airlines address their services.  
Tables A3, A4 and A5 in the appendix show the results of the estimation of the 
alternative specifications of the demand equation, the market share equation and the 
policy discount equation. The results are essentially identical to our previous estimation.   
In the Spanish case, Iberia’s dominance of the national airport network has the two 
following implications. First, Iberia is able to offer products of higher quality than its 
rivals for most of the routes where it operates. This allows the flag carrier to capture a 
high proportion of business travelers. And second, Iberia can take advantage of the cost 
economies derived from airport dominance to capture leisure travelers through more 
frequent price discounts. Both effects can damage future competition in the Spanish 
domestic market because the flag carrier can have a higher proportion of business 
passengers per flight and higher load factors per flight than its rivals. As we mentioned 
above, the large size of the Spanish market allows us to conclude that our results are 
representative for the other EU domestic markets.   
 
VI. Concluding remarks 
The contribution of this paper to the literature is to test the cost and demand 
advantages that an airline can obtain from airport dominance of a whole network in a 
market characterized by short-haul routes and congestion. Our empirical model shows 
that such advantages are related to provide a high flight frequency.  
Competition in the leisure segment of the market is mainly focused on price. Taking 
into account that a high service frequency allows a high utilization of crews and planes 
along with a cumulative exploitation of density economies, it can be argued that major 
carriers can take advantage of the cost economies derived from airport dominance when 
they compete for leisure travelers. As a result, they are able to offer major and/or more 
discounts in a market segment where prices must adjust to costs.  
In the business segment of the market, on the other hand, competition is mainly 
focused on quality. In this case, airport dominance can allow major carriers to take 
advantage of demand side economies. Indeed, a high service frequency is especially 
attractive for business travelers who are concerned more with reducing the trip time than  21
with saving money on a ticket, for which they usually do not pay. Moreover, high service 
frequency allows an airline to exploit marketing devices such as FFPs more efficiently. 
As a result, major carriers can charge high prices in the full fare classes without losing 
market share. The trend to convergence on prices in these fare classes can be explained 
by the modest effect that smaller airlines obtain from charging lower prices than their 
rivals (in terms of attracting business passengers).  
The fact that an airline that controls an airport network can offer large discounts in 
the leisure segment of the market and, at the same time, can offer a convenient flight 
schedule in the business segment of the market threatens the competitive position of its 
rivals, so that the effectiveness of competition can be seriously damaged. 
In European domestic markets, flag carriers can hold the advantages from airport 
control. Contrary to other network carriers, the Spanish flag carrier has shown a strong 
record of profits in last years. The dominance of a relatively large domestic market, 
within a context of airport congestion, arises as one of the possible explanations.  
We feel that the implementation of new rules for airport space allocation, especially 
regarding slots, could improve the scope of airline competition. In the Spanish case, 
recent forecasts for the main airports predict a large traffic increase for the period 2000-
2015. Thus, plans call for a doubling of the capacity of the main airports in the national 
network. A more balanced distribution of new slots in such airports is required to 
guarantee airline competition.   
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Notes 
1. The empirical literature on air transport generally rejects the hypothesis that potential 
competition has an important disciplining effect. See for example Morrison and Winston (1987) 
or Hurdle et al. (1989).  
2. Madrid and Barcelona airports are among the worst European airports in terms of average 
delays per movement (Reynolds-Feighan and Button 1999). In addition to this, the maximum  22
number of movements operated per hour was expected by 2004 at Madrid airport (Ministry of 
Transports, Order of October 19th) and by 2003 at Barcelona airport (Ministry of Transports, 
Order of October 22nd).  
3. Major contributions for the US case refer, among others, to Morrison and Winston (1989), 
Borenstein (1989), Dresner and Windle (1992), Evans and Kessides (1993) and Brueckner and 
Spiller (1994). Button et al. (1998) and Marín (1998), among others, discuss airlines competition 
in the European context.  
4. Relevant exceptions are the works of Marín(1995), Berry et al.(1996) and Schipper et al.(2002). 
5. It can be argued that business passengers are increasingly using services of low cost airlines in 
inter-European routes. However, this is particularly true in routes where low cost airlines offer a 
high flight frequency. 
6. Indeed, aircraft costs take place in three stages: during takeoff, during in-flight time at the 
cruise speed and during landing. With regard to the size of the aircraft scale diseconomies arise in 
takeoff and landing, while scale economies arise at the cruise speed. This fact explains that 
aircrafts that minimize costs have a lower size in short-haul than in long-haul routes.  
7. F(θ) must be interpreted as the proportion of consumers with a preference for quality less 
than θ. 
8. The unrestricted economy fare class is defined as the full economy fare class without 
restrictions on changes and refunds and without minimum stay requirements 
9. Indeed, our data shows a much more homogeneous distribution of the base fare than of the 
discounts across airlines. Indeed, the variation coefficient of the variable for the relative prices in 
the full economy fare class is equal to 0.07 while the variation coefficient of the variable for the 
discounts is 0.24.  
10. See for example Brander and Zhang (1990) and Oum et al. (1993). 
11. Alternatively, we could make explicit a model for the optimum amount of flight frequency. 
In the context of airport congestion and tight rules for slot allocation, we claim that flight 
frequency is exogenous. However, we test for a possible endogeneity bias in the empirical 
analysis.    
12. The amount of discounts made is strongly associated to the evolution of load factor figures 
as long as airlines pursue to maximize the average yield per passenger. Other factors being 
constant, a higher size of the aircraft makes more difficult to increase the proportion of seats 
sold. Thus, it could be argued that the amount of discounts and the size of the aircraft are 
simultaneously determined.  However, the possible endogeneity bias should be modest to the 
extent that airline choices on aircraft size can not be rapidly altered and depend on route 
characteristics (distance, demand forecasts, etc) and on the actual fleet at their disposal  23
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Table 1. Number of annual passengers carried in EU air markets. 2002 

















              Source: Eurostat 
 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics 
Variables (route level)  Mean  Standard Deviation  Minimum Value   Maximum value 
 
Traffic density (number of 
passengers) 
Prices (unrestricted economy class; 
euros) 
Price discounts (euros) 
Weekly flight frequency  
Population of the city-pairs 
Distance 































































Table 3. Demand equation (TSLS). Num. observations = 85 
Instruments for log(Pk) and log(Sk): log(Distk), log(equipk), log(APk), Competitors 

































   1.06 (0.05)** 
 
    0.47  (0.11)** 
 
 0.15 (0.10) 
 
  -0.36 (0.08)** 
 









    1.10  (0.09)** 
 






  0.21 (0.07)** 
R2adj. 
F-Statistic 
                 0.91 
               129.04** 
 
               0.90 
              86.84** 
















Table 4. Market share equation (TSLS). Num. observations = 215 
Instruments for log(Pjk/Pk): log(equipjk/equipk), log(APjk/ APk) 
Coefficients (White standard errors; Robust to heterocedasticity) 






























                            0.72 
135.25** 
            1. Significance at the 1% (**), 5% (*), 10%(+) 
 
Table 5. Pricing Equation (TSLS). Num. observations = 215 
Instruments for log(Qjk): log(Nk), Dislandk 
Coefficients (White standard errors; Robust to heterocedasticity) 
































F-Statistic                 
 
 
                          0.95 
792.21** 
                    1. Significance at the 1% (**), 5% (*), 10%(+) 
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Table 6. Policy discount equation (logit). Num. observations = 215 
Coefficients (White standard errors; Robust to heterocedasticity) 






























Wald test (χ2) 
                        0.28 
48.08**                          





















Table A1. Routes of the Spanish domestic market included in the sample  
 
Routes with origin in 
Madrid 
 
Routes with origin in 
Barcelona 
 
Routes with origin in de 
Palma Mallorca  



































Palma de Mallorca-Valencia 
Palma de Mallorca-Málaga 
Palma de Mallorca-Alicante     
Palma de Mallorca-Bilbao       
Palma de Mallorca-Menorca     




Table A2. Iberia’s market share in the main Spanish airports. 2002 
Airport  Percentage of national 
departures 
































































Table A3. Alternative specification of demand equation (TSLS).  
Num. observations = 85 
Instruments for log(Pk) and log(Sk): log(Distk), log(equipk), log(APk), Competitors 





























   1.06 (0.06)** 
 
    0.49  (0.10)** 
 
 0.18 (0.10)+ 
 
  -0.42 (0.08)** 
 







    1.10  (0.09)** 
 






  0.18 (0.07)* 
R2adj. 
F-Statistic 
                 0.90 
               135.99** 
 
               0.90 
              93.21** 
     1. Significance at the 1% (**), 5% (*), 10%(+) 
 
Table A4. Alternative specification of market share equation (TSLS).  
Num. observations = 215 
Instruments for log(Pjk/Pk): log(equipjk/equipk), log(APjk/ APk) 
Coefficients (White standard errors; Robust to heterocedasticity) 
































            1. Significance at the 1% (**), 5% (*), 10%(+) 
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Table A5. Alternative specification of policy discount equation (OLS).  
Num. observations = 215 
Coefficients (White standard errors; Robust to heterocedasticity) 






























Wald test (χ2) 
                        0.32 
20.87**                          
               1. Significance at the 1% (**), 5% (*), 10%(+) 
 
 
 
 